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PINE MOUNTAIN PRESERVE, LLLP v. COMMISSIONER
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rules 26.1-1, 26.1-2, 26.1-3, and 28-1(b), the
undersigned counsel of record hereby certifies that, to the best of her knowledge,
information, and belief, the following persons and entities have an interest in the
outcome of this appeal:
• Christensen, Jacob, attorney, Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice;
• Cleverdon, Edwin B., Senior Attorney, Internal Revenue Service;
• Crump, Horace, Associate Area Counsel, Internal Revenue Service;
• Desmond, Michael J., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service;
• Eddleman, Bill, Petitioner-Appellant;
• Eddleman, Douglas, Petitioner-Appellant;
• Eddleman Properties, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Petitioner-Appellant;
• Kelley, Matthew R., Attorney, Internal Revenue Service;
• Land Trust Accreditation Commission;
• Land Trust Alliance, Inc., Amicus;
• Lauber, Albert G., Judge, United State Tax Court;
• Levin, Michelle Abroms, Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant;
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• Levin, Robert H., Attorney for Amicus Land Trust Alliance;
• Levitt, Ronald A., Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant;
• Morrison, Richard T., Judge, United States Tax Court;
• Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP, Petitioner-Appellant;
• Rhodes, Gregory P., Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant;
• Rothenberg, Gilbert S., Chief, Appellate Section, Tax Division, Department
of Justice;
• Ugolini, Francesca, Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice;
• Wooldridge, David M., Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant;
•

Zuckerman, Richard E., Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax
Division, U.S. Department of Justice;

• Federal taxpayers subsidizing conservation easement acquisitions through
deductions available to donors of perpetual conservation easements;
• Communities enjoying the benefits of deductible perpetual conservation
easements;
• Past, present and future donors of deductible perpetual conservation
easements;
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• Those owning or anticipating ownership of conservation easementencumbered land who intend or hope to modify or abrogate all or part of the
perpetual use restrictions;
• Approximately 1,300 land trusts and similar charitable organizations
accepting conservation easements in the U.S., many of which have faced or
will face requests to relax or release easements’ perpetual use restrictions;
• Thousands of municipalities, districts, and other government entities holding
conservation easements and facing requests to relax or release the
easements’ perpetual use restrictions.
Except as included in general terms above, I believe there are no identified
corporations or publicly-traded companies having an interest in the outcome of this
appeal within the meaning of the Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1.
CONSENT TO FILE AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Department of Justice
consented to the filing of this brief acting through Francesca Ugolini of the U.S.
Department of Justice (Counsel for Commissioner of Internal Revenue). Pine
Mountain Preserve, LLLP (PMP), following concurrent receipt of a draft of this
brief, declined to consent in communications by David M. Wooldridge, acting for
C-3 of 3
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214

Case: 19-11795

Date Filed: 12/20/2019

Page: 5 of 123

Ronald A. Levitt, Gregory P. Rhodes, and Michelle A. Levin of Sirote & Permutt,
P.C. (Counsel for PMP). Under F.R.A.P. 29(a)(7), in a motion concurrently filed
with this brief, Amici K. King Burnett, Roger Colinvaux, John Echeverria, John
Leshy, Nancy Mclaughlin, Janet Milne, and Ann Taylor Schwing request the court’s
permission to file this brief.
RULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT
Amicus curiae certifies that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or
in part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or
submitting this brief, and no person other than an amicus contributed money to fund
this brief. Schwing authored this brief pro bono with suggestions from law
professors, the land trust community, and easement donors. Her amicus briefs
supporting perpetuity started with Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th
Cir.2014).
No person or party contributed funds for preparation or submission of this
brief; incidental costs initially borne by Schwing’s law firm will be reimbursed when
appeal is complete.
/s/ Ann Taylor Schwing
Ann Taylor Schwing
Attorney of Record for Amici Curiae
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INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are identified in the brief they filed in support of the Commissioner on

October 7, 2019 (Schwing Br.). In light of the cross-appeal and the second amicus
brief filed by Amicus Land Trust Alliance (LTA) in support of Pine Mountain
Preserve, LLLP (PMP), Amici seek to respond to new arguments made, highlight
issues that powerfully support the Commissioner, and bring broader legal and policy
issues to the Court’s attention.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did PMP’s easements violate I.R.C. §170(h)(5)(A)?

III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trustworthiness of land trusts and post-donation IRS oversight of tax-

exempt entities are irrelevant to this case. The sole question before this Court is
whether PMP’s easements complied with §170(h) requirements at the time of their
donation. They did not.
Congress did not grant holders the discretion to site building areas or amend
easements post-donation applying a “consistency-with-conservation-purposes”
standard. Because of the partial interest nature of conservation easements and the
significant potential for abuse, Congress mandated that deductible easements satisfy
numerous requirements at the time of their donation, and the IRS must verify
compliance with those requirements at that time.
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Amici previously explained that Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th
Cir.2014), and examples in the Treasury Regulations interpreting §170(h)
(Regulations) make it clear that the IRS must verify compliance with Regulation
§1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3)’s “no-inconsistent-use” requirement at the time of an
easement’s donation. Schwing Br. at 3-7, 22-28. Additional factors reinforce this
conclusion. At the time the Regulations were being finalized, Treasury specifically
rejected a recommendation to grant holders post-donation discretion under a
consistency-with-conservation-purposes standard. Section IV.A.1. herein. The
Regulations themselves indicate that, in determining compliance with the noinconsistent-use requirement, the focus must be on the terms of the easement, not on
post-donation activity. The legislative history also makes clear that Congress
intended “the perpetual restrictions” in deductible easements to be enforced by
holders against “all other parties in interest,” and not that the restrictions would be
modifiable post-donation at the request of landowners. S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 13
(1980). PMP’s movable-building-site and amendment clauses violate §170(h)(5)(A)
because they make it impossible for the Commissioner (or a court) to verify
compliance with the no-inconsistent-use requirement at the time of donation.
PMP’s amendment clause also renders its easements nondeductible because
the clause permits “trade-off” amendments, which authorize uses destructive of
conservation interests (a clear violation of the no-inconsistent-use requirement) in
-2Electroniccopy
copyavailable
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exchange for the landowner providing purportedly offsetting conservation benefits.
Schwing Br. at 8-11. Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3) flatly precludes that kind of
post-donation dealmaking. Trade-off amendments, if authorized, would also render
Regulation §1.170A-14(g)(6)’s extinguishment requirements largely a nullity
because trade-off amendments can be used in lieu of extinguishment to achieve the
same ends.
Although §170(h) and the Regulations do not expressly address amendments,
the various requirements therein do establish the parameters of permissible
amendment discretion. A §170(h)-compliant amendment clause ensures continued
protection of the conservation interests that were identified as worthy of protection
at the time of an easement’s donation. In contrast, under PMP’s movable-buildingarea and amendment clauses, protection of those conservation interests is subject to
the whim of post-donation negotiations.
Finally, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act specifically authorizes the
creation of §170(h)-compliant easements, noncompliance with §170(h)(5)(A) is not
a new argument, and Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 567 U.S. 142 (2012), does
not prevent this Court from enforcing the law.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Holder Trustworthiness And IRS Oversight Of Tax-Exempt
Organizations Are Irrelevant

PMP argues that §170(h) permits land trusts to site building areas and amend
easements post-donation applying a consistency-with-conservation-purposes
standard, and that post-donation IRS oversight of tax-exempt entities ensures that
land trusts will “do their job.” PMP’s Reply Brief at 1-2, 7-9. That argument fails
for one simple reason: Congress did not grant holders that discretion. Because of the
partial interest nature of conservation easements and the significant potential for
abuse, Congress mandated that deductible easements satisfy numerous requirements
at the time of donation,1 and the IRS must verify compliance with those requirements
at that time. Holder trustworthiness and post-donation IRS oversight of tax-exempt
entities are irrelevant to whether an easement is deductible under §170(h).
The sole question before this Court is whether PMP’s easements complied
with §170(h) requirements at the time of their donation. Amici previously explained
that the answer to that question is no, in part because PMP’s movable-building-site
and amendment clauses make it impossible for the Commissioner (or a court) to
verify compliance with Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3)’s no-inconsistent-use
Schwing, Ann Taylor, Perpetuity Is Forever, Almost Always: Why It Is Wrong to
Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 37
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 217, 221 (2013).

1
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requirement at the time of donation. Schwing Br. at 3-7, 22-28. The following
additional factors reinforce that conclusion.
1. Post-Donation Discretion Argument Was Previously Rejected
Treasury published proposed regulations interpreting §170(h) in 1983 and
invited public comment.2 A group of land trusts submitted written comments,
including comments on the no-inconsistent-use requirement and Example 4 in
proposed regulation §1.170A-13(f). Small, Stephen J., The Federal Tax Law of
Conservation Easements (4th ed. 1997), at 1-4—1-5 and Appendix D.3
Example 4 in proposed regulation §1.170A-13(f) provided in relevant part
(emphasis added):
Assume the same facts as in example (3) [900 acres on the crest of a
mountain], except that not all of Greenacre is visible from the park and the
deed of easement allows for limited cluster development of no more than five
nine-acre clusters (with four houses on each cluster) located in areas generally
not visible from the national park and subject to site and building plan
approval by the donee organization in order to preserve the scenic view from
the park. The donor and the donee have already identified sites where limited
cluster development would not be visible from the park or would not
measurably impair the view.… Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a
deduction under this section.
In their comments, the land trusts recommended that the italicized sentence
be deleted from the Example and that the easement deed not require cluster
development or limit the total number of residences. Small at D-22—D-23, D-26. In
2
3

Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13, 48 Fed. Reg. 22940, 22941 (May 23, 1983).
Appendix D, the land trust comments, is included in the Addendum.
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other words, the land trusts recommended that the Example grant the donee the
discretion to approve the amount, type, and location of residential development on
the property post-donation, subject only to the requirements that the sites be
“carefully selected” and “in areas generally not visible from the national park” to
preserve the scenic view. Id. In effect, the land trusts recommended that donees be
granted the right to exercise post-donation discretion regarding development under
a consistency-with-conservation-purposes standard. That recommendation was
rejected and the key factors in Example 4—the requirement of cluster development,
the limit on the number of residences, and the fact that the donor and donee have
already identified [at the time of donation] sites where limited cluster development
would not be visible from the park or would not measurably impair the view—remain
in the Example in the final Regulation, thus enabling the IRS to verify compliance
with the no-inconsistent-use requirement at the time of the easement’s donation.
Regulation §1.170A-14(f), Example 4.4
The land trusts also recommended that the no-inconsistent-use regulation be
modified to state: “No use the exercise of which is subject to prior approval of the
donee shall be treated as an inconsistent use under this section.” Small at D-25. That
too was rejected.
4

The only change in Example 4 from the proposed to the final Regulation was to
remove “measurably,” thus making the cluster sites identified at the time of donation
even more protective.
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Thus, PMP’s fundamental argument—that Congress intended to trust land
trusts to site building areas and otherwise verify compliance with §170(h)
requirements post-donation under a consistency-with-conservation-purposes
standard—was previously proposed and rejected by Treasury as inconsistent with
congressional intent. There is no basis for this Court to now reinterpret §170(h) and
the Regulations to adopt a long-rejected position.
2. Additional Relevant Regulations And Legislative History
In PBBM-Rose Hill Limited v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 201-203 (5th
Cir.2018), the Fifth Circuit held that, in determining whether the public-access
requirement is satisfied, the Regulations indicate that the focus should be on the
terms of the easement, not on post-donation activity. Regulations addressing the noinconsistent-use requirement similarly indicate that, in determining whether that
requirement is satisfied, the focus must be on the terms of the easement. Regulation
§1.170A-14(e)(2) provides (emphasis added):
a deduction will not be allowed if the contribution would accomplish one of
the enumerated conservation purposes but would permit destruction of other
significant conservation interests. For example, the preservation of farmland
pursuant to a State program for flood prevention and control would not qualify
… if under the terms of the contribution a significant naturally occurring
ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides ….
Regulation §1.170A-14(d)(4)(v) similarly provides (emphasis added):
[a] deduction will not be allowed for the preservation of open space … if the
terms of the easement permit a degree of intrusion or future development that
-7Electroniccopy
copyavailable
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would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or with the
governmental conservation policy that is being furthered by the donation. See
§1.170A-14(e)(2) for rules relating to inconsistent use.
Tasking the IRS with determining, at the time of donation, whether an
easement permits uses destructive of significant conservation interests or an
unacceptable “degree of intrusion or future development” would have been senseless
if the parties could site building areas and otherwise modify restrictions postdonation. The IRS must be able to verify compliance with these requirements by
reviewing the terms of an easement at the time of its donation. Granting holders postdonation discretion to site building areas and otherwise modify restrictions puts
taxpayers beyond the reach of the Commissioner in this regard. Schwing Br. at 2425.
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax Treatment Extension Act
of 1980, which provides detailed guidance on what Congress intended when it
adopted §170(h), further supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
grant holders post-donation discretion to site building areas and otherwise modify
restrictions. S. Rep. No. 96-1007 (1980) (Senate Report). For example, the Senate
Report provides:
By requiring that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity, the
committee intends that the perpetual restrictions must be enforceable by the
donee organization (and successors in interest) against all other parties in
interest (including successors in interest). Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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The committee refers to “the perpetual restrictions,” not to restrictions that
may be modified post-donation. Id. Further, a direction to enforce perpetual
restrictions against all other parties in interest is a far cry from a grant of discretion
to modify restrictions at the request of landowners. It strains credulity to read this
directive as a grant of discretion to donees to site building areas and otherwise
modify restrictions post-donation.
The Senate Report also emphasizes that strict standards apply when
determining both the type of property eligible for tax subsidies and the restrictions
that must be imposed on its use. To ensure that only qualifying easements receive
deductions, the committee expressed its expectation that taxpayers could obtain
“prior administrative determination[s]” on whether their donations would qualify.
Id. at 13. Such determinations are based on detailed analyses of both the subject
properties’ attributes and the easements’ specific terms. E.g., IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200208019. The committee also said it expected Treasury to make publication of
regulations interpreting §170(h) a “highest priority.” Senate Report at 13. These
expressions of concern about the need to ensure that only easements protecting
specific properties and containing specific terms receive tax subsidies would have
been nonsensical if the committee contemplated that the parties could, after the
initial donations, site building areas and otherwise modify restrictions under a
consistency-with-conservation-purposes standard.
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In sum, nothing in the Code, Regulations, or legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to grant developers multi-million dollar deductions for easement
donations that allow them to engage on the subject properties in whatever uses in
whatever locations that the holders might from time to time agree are consistent with
broadly-stated conservation purposes.5
3. Reliance On Post-Donation Enforcement Tools Is Misguided
Apart from being contrary to §170(h) and the Regulations, the requirements
of which must be satisfied at the time of donation, PMP’s reliance on post-donation
enforcement tools is misguided. On close inspection, the “commitment-andresources” test of Regulation §1.170A-14(c)(1) simply restates the standard
governing tax-exemption and thus does not provide the IRS an additional postdonation enforcement tool.6 Further, if this Court were to authorize holders to agree
to amendments and site building areas post-donation under a consistency-withconservation-purposes standard, a holder’s exercise of that discretion would not
violate rules governing tax exemption, even if the holder agreed to trade-offs that
permitted uses destructive of conservation interests on the originally-protected
property. The rules governing tax exemption prohibit charities from providing

5

Such open-ended discretion would also make accurate valuation of easements
virtually impossible.
6
Colinvaux, Roger, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement
Challenges, and Reform, 3 Utah L. Rev. 755, 759-760 (2013).
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economic benefits to private parties. They do not prohibit uses destructive of
conservation interests on easement-encumbered properties—that is a §170(h)
deduction requirement.7
Finally, the rules governing tax-exemption and Form 990 reporting
requirements do not apply to an entire class of qualified holders—government
entities. Congress and Treasury obviously could not have intended to rely on taxexemption and Form 990 reporting rules to ensure compliance with §170(h) when
many donees are not subject to those rules.
B.

Additional Points On Amendments
1.

The No-Inconsistent-Use Requirement Precludes PostDonation Dealmaking

Pursuant

to

Regulation

§1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3)’s

no-inconsistent-use

requirement, a deductible easement may not permit uses that are destructive of
(impair, injure, or destroy) conservation interests on the subject property, subject to
one very limited exception. Schwing Br. at 6-7. Although §170(h)(5)(A) establishes
the general requirement that the conservation purpose of an easement be protected
in perpetuity, the no-inconsistent-use requirement is intentionally more finegrained—it focuses on protection of the subject property’s specific conservation
interests. Id.
7

Colinvaux at 764, n.42.
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PMP’s easements violate the no-inconsistent-use requirement because they
include a clause that permits amendments authorizing uses destructive of
conservation interests on the subject property (a clear violation of the noinconsistent-use requirement) in exchange for the current landowner providing
purportedly offsetting conservation benefits elsewhere (“trade-off” amendments).
Id. at 8-11. The parties to an easement are not permitted to transgress the noinconsistent-use requirement post-donation just because they deem the easement’s
conservation purposes to, on balance, continue to be protected. The no-inconsistentuse requirement flatly precludes that kind of post-donation dealmaking.
2.

“Conservation Interests” Is Not Synonymous With
“Conservation Purposes”

LTA attempts to dismiss PMP’s clear violation of the no-inconsistent-use
requirement by arguing that “conservation interests” in Regulation §1.170A14(e)(2)-(3) is synonymous with “conservation purposes.” LTA Second Amicus at
7. LTA would like this Court to reinterpret that Regulation to grant holders postdonation discretion that Congress specifically intended to deny, namely the
discretion to engage in post-donation dealmaking under a consistency-withconservation-purposes standard. LTA’s argument is baseless.
Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3)’s no-inconsistent-use requirement is based
on a specific directive in the Senate Report, which uses the term “conservation
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interests” in a manner that clearly distinguishes it from “conservation purposes.”
Senate Report at 13. Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2), which is drawn from the Senate
Report, provides “a deduction will not be allowed if the contribution would
accomplish one of the enumerated conservation purposes but would permit
destruction of other significant conservation interests.” Id. It then provides an
example, also drawn from the Senate Report, of what that quoted sentence means:
“the preservation of farmland pursuant to a State program for flood prevention and
control would not qualify under paragraph (d)(4) of this section [the preservation of
open space (including farmland) “conservation purpose”] if under the terms of the
contribution a significant naturally occurring ecosystem [a “conservation interest”]
could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides in the operation of the farm.”
Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2); Senate Report at 13.
LTA’s argument that the term “conservation interests” is undefined and likely
to result in a “chaotic scramble” regarding its meaning is also without merit. LTA
Second Amicus at 9. In most cases, a conservation easement states its general
“conservation purposes” and then identifies the specific conservation features on the
subject property worthy of permanent protection. For example, PMP’s 2005
easement states its general “Conservation Purposes” as preservation of the subject
property as relatively natural habitat and as open space, and then identifies the
specific features of the property that have ecological and scenic significance,
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including the “Oak-Pine community,” “a scenic woodland view from US Highway
#280,” “documented species of birds, Northern Flicker and Red-Headed
Woodpecker,” and “rare plant species … Georgia Aster and Yellow Honeysuckle”
(defined as “Conservation Values”). 2005 Easement at 2. The term “conservation
interests” used in the Senate Report and the Regulations is synonymous with PMP’s
term “Conservation Values”—both refer to the specific conservation features on the
subject property, the permanent protection of which will carry out the general
conservation purposes of the easement.
Furthermore, the “conservation purposes” enumerated in §170(h)(4)(A) are
“the preservation of” open space, historic land or structures, or land areas for
outdoor recreation or education, and “the protection of ” a relatively natural habitat.
It makes neither logical nor grammatical sense to speak of, for example, injuring or
destroying “the preservation of” land areas for outdoor recreation. But it makes
perfect sense to speak of injuring or destroying the “Oak-Pine community,” the
“scenic woodland view from US Highway #280,” or the habitat for the Red-Headed
Woodpecker.
That “conservation interest” does not appear in §170(h) is also irrelevant.
Congress specifically delegated the task of publishing regulations to Treasury, and
the Senate Report includes the passage on which the no-inconsistent-use Regulation
is based and uses the term “conservation interests.” Senate Report at 13. In addition,
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terms such as “extinguishment” and “mortgage subordination” also do not appear in
§170(h) but Courts have not hesitated to enforce the extinguishment and mortgage
subordination Regulations. Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir.2014);
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir.2015).8
Finally, in their comments to Treasury on the proposed regulations, land
trusts recommended that the term “conservation interests” in the first sentence of
what is now Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2) be changed to “conservation purposes.”
Small at D-21, D-24. That recommendation was rejected, making it absolutely clear
that Treasury did not consider the terms to be synonymous and considered the
proposed change contrary to congressional intent.
3. Trade-Off Amendments Would Render Extinguishment
Requirements A Nullity
A conservation easement that authorizes trade-off amendments authorizes the
parties to agree to develop part of the originally-protected property in exchange for
a purported offsetting conservation benefit. Rather than having to extinguish the

LTA argues that Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2) “prohibits uses that are inconsistent
with specific conservation purposes.” LTA Second Amicus at 10 (emphasis in
original). That is incorrect. The Regulation focuses on “destruction” of “significant
conservation interests” and “inconsistent” appears only in the heading. Also,
Treasury’s reference to “enumerated conservation interests” in its comments on the
proposed regulations is irrelevant. Id. at 9-10, n.12. Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)(3) is the law, and the proposed and final Regulations and Senate Report use
“significant conservation interests.”
8
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easement on the part of the property to be developed (which would require
satisfaction of the judicial proceeding, impossibility or impracticality, and proceeds
requirements of Regulation §1.170A-14(g)(6)), the parties could instead agree to
“amend” the easement to remove development restrictions on that part of the
property in exchange for the landowner’s agreement to add use restrictions
elsewhere on the property or add nearby land to the easement, with the “net” effect
purportedly being consistent with conservation purposes. Such dramatic changes to
the perpetual easement restrictions would occur in a vacuum in which none of the
deduction requirements or indirect policing that occurs in the IRS tax return review
and audit process would apply. The amendment would also render the
extinguishment requirements a nullity. The parties would not need to comply with
the judicial proceeding or other important safeguards that Congress and Treasury
imposed on extinguishment; they could simply amend the easement to achieve the
same ends.
This is not a theoretical concern. The Path of the Pronghorn controversy,
referenced in note 5 of Amici’s first brief, provides an example of a proposed tradeoff amendment. In that controversy, a land trust agreed to amend a deductible
easement to allow residential development on 15-acres in the center of the Path of
the Pronghorn, a federally-designated 5,800-year-old migration route (a clear
violation of the no-inconsistent-use requirement), in exchange for the landowner’s
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agreement to protect other land to the north. While the land trust argued that the
trade-off would result in a “net” ecological gain, many, including scientists,
disagreed. Moreover, by agreeing to the trade-off, the land trust could permit
development of the 15 acres (and destruction of conservation interests there) without
having to formally extinguish the easement. Although this amendment was never
consummated, the controversy illustrates that trade-off amendments could be used
in lieu of extinguishment to achieve the same ends.
4. The Sky Will Not Fall
LTA asserts: “Conservation easement holders have used amendment
provisions similar to those in this case since the Regulations were first issued” and
if this Court does not uphold PMP’s amendment clause “thousands of conservation
easements” will be disqualified. LTA Second Amicus at 28, 31. However, LTA
provides no evidence for these assertions other than to point to a few land trust model
easement forms, which are not intended to provide tax advice and are often modified
by donors seeking tax benefits, and to its own publications, which are aimed at land
trusts and also not intended to provide legal advice. Id. at 27-28.9 Moreover, not all
amendment provisions are the same, and each must be examined individually in the
context of the entire easement to see if it complies with §170(h). Schwing Br. at 16-

9

Byers, Elizabeth & Ponte, Karin Marchetti, The Conservation Easement Handbook
3 (2d ed. 2005) (“This handbook is not a substitute for legal counsel”).
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18, 22. Finally, alleged widespread use of a noncompliant provision does not justify
upholding its use—just the opposite is true—as recognized by the Fifth Circuit. Id.
at 18, 29.
5. §170(h)-Compliant Amendment Clause
While §170(h) and the Regulations do not expressly address amendments,
various requirements therein do establish the parameters of permissible amendment
discretion. A §170(h)-compliant amendment clause may authorize the parties to
agree to “protection-enhancing” amendments, but may not authorize the parties to
agree to amendments that (i) remove land from the easement (a nonjudicial
extinguishment violating Regulation §1.170A-14(g)(6)), (ii) permit uses destructive
of conservation interests (e.g., trade-offs, which violate Regulation §1.170A14(e)(2)-(3)’s no-inconsistent-use requirement), or (iii) relax or eliminate provisions
included in the easement to comply with deduction requirements, including the
restriction-on-transfer,

judicial-extinguishment,

and

division-of-proceeds

requirements (Regulation §§1.170A-14(c)(2), -14(g)(6)(i)-(ii)).
“Protection-enhancing” amendments are those that enhance protection of the
subject property’s conservation interests and the easement’s conservation purposes
but do not involve trade-offs. Examples include adding acreage or restrictions,
eliminating

reserved

rights,

or

updating

language.

Protection-enhancing
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amendments may qualify as additional deductible gifts. Strasburg v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2000-94.
If LTA’s assertions are correct—that “amendment requests are rare” and
“detrimental amendments” (presumably those that authorize uses destructive of
conservation interests in violation of the no-inconsistent-use requirement) “are
extremely rare” (LTA Second Amicus at 25)—then a §170(h)-compliant amendment
clause provides ample discretion to holders to agree to post-donation amendments.
The “extremely rare” amendment that exceeds the authority granted to the parties in
§170(h)-compliant clause is either not permitted or requires judicial approval.
Schwing Br. at 15.
LTA asserts that, if this Court finds that PMP’s amendment provision violates
§170(h), “easement donors and holders [will] simply avoid including … amendment
clauses in their easements.” LTA Second Amicus at 24. The more likely scenario is
that donors and their counsel will draft §170(h)-compliant amendment clauses.
6. Balancing Conservation Purposes And Responding To Changed
Conditions Without Violating The No-Inconsistent-Use
Requirement
LTA asserts that land trusts need discretion to amend easements under a
consistency-with-conservation-purposes standard (engage in trade-offs) because
easements frequently serve more than one conservation purpose, such as the
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protection of farmland as open space and habitat. LTA Second Amicus at 10-11.
However, not all easements serve more than one purpose and there are ways to
balance purposes when they do without granting the parties discretion to agree to
trade-offs.
For example, Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(3) provides that “[a] donor may
continue a pre-existing use of the property that does not conflict with the
conservation purposes of the gift.” Example 2 of Regulation §1.170A-14(f) involves
just such a case. Protection of the operating farm in that Example with an easement
that allows normal agricultural uses (which may impair habitat) does not violate the
no-inconsistent-use requirement because normal agricultural uses are pre-existing
and do not conflict with the conservation purpose of the gift—protection of farmland
as open space. Alternatively, if the property contained a wetland that constituted a
significant naturally occurring ecosystem, the easement could include a second
purpose of protecting habitat and restrictions to protect the wetland. But the
landowner would not (and should not) be entitled to a deduction for the easement if
it permitted destruction of the wetland through the use of pesticides. Regulation
§1.170A-14(e)(2); Senate Report at 13.
LTA also asserts that holders need the discretion to amend easements under a
consistency-with-conservation-purposes standard (engage in trade-offs) to respond
to changing conditions. LTA Second Amicus at 12-13. LTA offers the example of
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an easement that prohibits timber harvesting and then posits various changed
conditions. Id. None of the posited changed conditions necessitate granting the
holder discretion to agree to trade-offs.
Relocation of an endangered species would not be a justification for amending
the easement in a manner that would injure or destroy remaining significant
conservation interests on the originally-protected property; rather, the holder should
seek another easement on the property to which the species relocated. A clause
permitting protection-enhancing amendments would enable the parties to modify
terms to address harmful invasives, dying or diseased trees, or restoration of a forest
destroyed by fire in a manner that does not injure or destroy conservation interests.
Many issues involving changed conditions are also anticipated and addressed in the
drafting of easements, obviating the need for post-donation amendments.
Finally, if the parties decide that a post-donation amendment authorizing uses
destructive of conservation interests on the originally-protected property is
necessary, they can seek court approval. Given the intense pressures placed on
holders to acquiesce to owner demands, Congress wisely did not grant the parties
discretion to make such fundamental changes in unregulated and unsupervised
transactions.
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UCEA Authorizes Creation Of §170(h)-Compliant Easements

PMP posits that any conservation easement created under the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) is freely modifiable or terminable by the
parties. PMP’s Reply Brief at 12-14. That is neither correct nor consistent with the
UCEA drafter’s intent. Moreover, PMP’s interpretation would mean that drafting
easements to comply with §170(h) requirements at the time of donation would be
pointless in UCEA states because the parties would be free to change easement terms
post-donation. Neither Congress nor the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) intended
that the terms included in deductible easements to comply with §170(h) would be
useless window-dressing. Rather, both understood that deductible easements
constitute charitable grants and state courts and attorneys general have the power
and the duty to enforce such grants. Schwing Br. at 12-13.10
PMP appears to argue that the ULC changed its position on this issue when it
revised the UCEA Comments in 2007. PMP’s Reply Brief at 13 n.11. That is
incorrect. The original UCEA prefatory note explains that the act “enables the
structuring of transactions so as to achieve tax benefits which may be available under
10

That there have been no “federal court opinion[s]” involving detrimental
amendments (LTA Second Brief at 29) is understandable. Challenges to enforce
easements are brought in state courts by attorneys general and others with standing.
McLaughlin, Nancy A., Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity
Standards for Federally Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 2: Comparison
to State Law, 46 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 1, 28, 30, 36, 39 (2011) (Myrtle Grove
controversy, Bjork v. Draper, Wal-Mart controversy, Salzburg v. Dowd).
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the Internal Revenue Code” but warns “parties intending to attain them must be
mindful of the specific provisions of the … tax laws which are applicable.” Uniform
Conservation Easement Act 3-4 (1981).11 The original comment to UCEA §3 further
explains that the act “leaves intact” existing law of adopting states as it relates to the
modification and termination of easements and the enforcement of charitable trusts
and “independently of the Act, the Attorney General could have standing [to enforce
an easement].” Id. §3 cmt.12
While §2(a) of the UCEA provides that “a conservation easement may be
created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, [or] terminated ... in the
same manner as other easements,” King Burnett, who served on the UCEA drafting
committee, notes that “[t]his refers to the formalities and requirements applicable to
these actions, such as the size of the paper, notarization, and witness requirements.”13
Burnett explains: “The Act was not intended to affect other laws that might condition
or limit a holder’s ability to release, or to agree to modify or terminate a conservation

Courts rely on comments in interpreting uniform acts. Yale University v.
Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993).
12
Charitable gifts or grants made for specific purposes are often referred to as
charitable trusts because such gifts are enforceable under charitable trust principles.
Restatement (Third) Trusts §28, cmt. a (2003).
13
Burnett, K. King, The Uniform Conservation Easement Act: Reflections of a
Member of the Drafting Committee, 2013 Utah L. Rev. 773, 780.
11
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easement, including the laws applicable to … organizations soliciting and accepting
charitable gifts ….”14
Furthermore, the UCEA comments were amended in 2007, not because the
ULC changed its position, but to (i) update the UCEA to reflect the Restatement
(Third) Property: Servitudes (2000) and the Uniform Trust Code (2000), both of
which call for the application of charitable principles to donated easements, and (ii)
“prevent section 2(a) from being erroneously interpreted as authorizing holders and
property owners to mutually agree to substantially modify and terminate
conservation easements, regardless of the express terms of the easements or the
circumstances of their creation.”15
Burnett also points out that conservation easements extinguishable by mutual
agreement of the parties are not eligible for a §170(h) deduction and adds:
If section 2(a)…were interpreted to authorize holders and property owners to
mutually agree to modify and terminate conservation easements regardless of
the terms of the easements or the manner of their creation, section 2(a) would
preclude the creation of tax-deductible easements … [which] would be
directly contrary to the intent of the Drafting Committee.16
Thus, contrary to PMP’s assertion in its Reply Brief (at 13), it is not the
Commissioner’s position that imperils the deductibility of conservation easements,
but PMP’s interpretation of the UCEA contrary to its drafters’ intent.
14

Burnett at 780.
Id. at 781.
16
Id. at 782.
15
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Against its own interest, PMP argues that Alabama’s version of the UCEA
allows the parties to mutually agree to modify or terminate a conservation easement
regardless of its terms or manner of creation. PMP’s Reply Brief at 12-13, n.11.
However, no court in Alabama (or any state) has interpreted §2(a) of the UCEA to
so provide,17 and Alabama’s version of the UCEA does not appear to abrogate
existing state laws governing the enforceability of charitable grants.18
This Court need not address this state law issue and should not be distracted
by it. Regardless of how Alabama law might be interpreted, PMP’s easements are
not eligible for a §170(h) deduction because they permit trade-off amendments and
the siting of building areas post-donation in violation of the no-inconsistent-use
requirement.
D.

Noncompliance With §170(h)(5)(A) Is Not A New Argument

PMP asserts that the Commissioner never raised §170(h)(5)(A) as a separate
issue in its post-trial briefs in Tax Court. PMP’s Reply Brief at 31. That is incorrect.
In his opening brief in Tax Court, the Commissioner clearly asserted that
PMP’s easements violate both §170(h)(2)(C) and §170(h)(5)(A) and that these “are

17

Only the law in North Dakota has been adjudged to preclude creation of deductible
easements. Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 140 (2014).
18
Alabama Code §35-18-6 (“The provisions of this chapter … shall not be construed
to repeal any law or part of law except for those in direct conflict herewith”); id.
§19-3B-414(d) (excepting conservation easements from termination-ofuneconomic-trusts provision).
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separate and distinct requirements.” Respondent’s Opening Brief at 3, 59-60.
Moreover, in his discussion of §170(h)(5)(A), the Commissioner specifically
asserted that PMP’s easements violated Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)’s noinconsistent-use requirement. Id. at 65-66. In his answering brief in Tax Court, the
Commissioner again asserted the §170(h)(5)(A) argument separately from the
§170(h)(2)(C) argument, but did so in an abbreviated fashion “[b]ecause Respondent
believe[d] his Opening Brief fully cover[ed] the issues in this case.” Respondent’s
Answering Brief at 22-23.
That both the §170(h)(2)(C) and §170(h)(5)(A) arguments were raised as
separate issues is also readily apparent from the Tax Court’s opinion. Pine Mountain
Preserve, LLP v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 247, at 279-280, 285-286 (2018).
Moreover, PMP itself makes arguments based on §170(h)(5)(A). In PMP’s
initial brief filed with this Court, PMP refers to §170(h)(5)(A) in several places and
concludes, in part: “The Tax Court’s interpretation runs contrary to congressional
intent as to section 170(h)(2)(C) and 170(h)(5)(A).” PMP’s Initial Brief at 52. In
addition, one of PMP’s primary arguments in its reply brief is that “Congress
assigned to land trusts the role of … protecting the conservation purposes of the
easement in perpetuity.” PMP’s Reply Brief at 1. That is a §170(h)(5)(A) protectedin-perpetuity argument.
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PMP also relies specifically (although, for reasons Amici have explained,
incorrectly) on Regulation §1.170A-14(f)’s Example 4. PMP’s Initial Brief at 9, 5051; PMP’s Reply Brief at 25-26. Example 4 in part illustrates the operation of
§170(h)(5)(A)’s protected-in-perpetuity requirement and its component noinconsistent-use requirement (Regulation §1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3)). PMP obviously
cannot itself make arguments based on §170(h)(5)(A) and the no-inconsistent-use
requirement and then claim the Commissioner cannot counter those arguments
because §170(h)(5)(A) arguments are somehow “new.”
In sum, this Court is not barred from considering arguments raised by both
parties and acknowledged or addressed by the Tax Court simply because the Tax
Court majority based its holding regarding the 2005 and 2006 easements on
§170(h)(2)(C).
E.

Christopher Does Not Authorize Noncompliance With the Law

PMP misreads Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 567 U.S. 142 (2012).
Christopher provides that interpretation of laws enforced by a government agency
involves a two-step process. First, the court determines if the agency’s interpretation
is entitled to Auer deference. Id. at 153-159. Second, the court interprets and applies
the law, giving the agency’s interpretation “a measure of deference proportional to
… its power to persuade.” Id. at 159-161. If the court determines that an agency’s
interpretation is neither entitled to Auer deference nor persuasive in its own right,
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the court must employ traditional tools of interpretation, and may ultimately come
to the same conclusion as the agency, as the dissent did in Christopher. Id. at 161,
170.
Christopher does not, as PMP implies, authorize a court to ignore or overrule
a statute or regulation simply because it determines that an agency’s interpretation
is not entitled to Auer deference. All of the excerpts from Christopher in PMP’s
reply brief are drawn from the Supreme Court’s analysis in the first (deference) step.
PMP’s Reply Brief at 2, 11, 30. PMP ignores the second step, in which the court
actually interprets and applies the law.
Even if this Court were to determine that the IRS’s interpretation of §170(h)
is neither entitled to Auer deference nor persuasive in its own right,19 this Court
should not automatically accept PMP’s flawed interpretation of law. Rather, under
Christopher, this Court should employ traditional tools of interpretation, and, for the
reasons discussed in this and Amici’s first brief, this Court should ultimately come
to the same conclusion as the IRS—that PMP’s easements did not satisfy §170(h)
requirements at the time of their donation.
19

Amici are not suggesting that the IRS’s interpretation is not entitled to deference
or persuasive in its own right; the facts of this case are distinguishable from
Christopher. In this case, the statute, Regulations, and legislative history provide
notice; there is no evidence that use of PMP’s movable-building-site and amendment
clauses has been industry-wide practice; the IRS’s interpretation is not flatly
inconsistent with §170(h); and the IRS is asserting only that PMP’s movablebuilding-site and amendment clauses violate §170(h), not a blanket rule.
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Furthermore, the IRS’s failure to challenge allegedly similar clauses in
previous cases also does not render §170(h) requirements unenforceable. Easements
are highly complex, individualized documents, and apparent similarities in clauses
often disappear upon a closer read of the entire document. In addition, “[a]n agency
generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with
enforcing.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). The obvious limits on the
IRS’s ability to act against each violation must also be viewed in light of the
opportunity for taxpayers to obtain prior administrative determinations of
compliance with §170(h) requirements.
Finally, Executive Order 13892 is inapplicable; PMP had prior notice of both
IRS jurisdiction and the applicable legal standards.
V.

CONCLUSION
PMP and LTA are asking this Court to grant holders more post-donation

discretion than they were granted under §170(h). This is the wrong venue in which
to make that argument. Policy arguments in favor of modifying §170(h) to grant
holders more post-donation discretion should be made to Congress. Given the
billions being invested in deductible easements and continued reports of abuse, it is
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unlikely Congress would revise §170(h) to grant holders greater discretion without
also adding significant new safeguards.20
Moreover, if this Court were to hold that PMP’s movable-building area and
amendment clauses do not violate §170(h) requirements, such clauses would become
the norm, and conservation protections would be subject to the whim of postdonation negotiations. Even land trusts reluctant to move building areas or agree to
trade-offs would find it extremely difficult to hold the line in the face of intense
pressure from landowners and the threat of expensive and time-consuming litigation
for refusing to do so. The importance of this case lies in the fact that this Court’s
ruling will either arrest PMP’s destructive, ill-advised line of thinking, or greatly
accelerate its adoption and implementation.
For the foregoing reasons and those discussed in Amici’s first brief, Amici
urge the Court to affirm the Tax Court’s disallowance of deductions for the 2005
and 2006 easements, reverse the Tax Court’s allowance of the deduction for the 2007
easement, and rectify the mistakes the Tax Court made in its discussion of
amendments.

U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Newsroom, Grassley, Wyden Launch Probe
of Conservation Tax Benefit Abuse (March 27, 2019); Looney, Adam, Charitable
Contributions of Conservation Easements (Brookings Institution May 2017);
Stephens, Joe & Ottaway, David B., Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, Wash.
Post, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1.
20
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DATED: December 20, 2019
By: /s/ Ann Taylor Schwing
Attorney and Amicus Curiae
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ADDENDUM

1. Proposed Treasury Regulation §1.170A-13, 48 Fed. Reg. 22941
(May 23, 1983)
2. Small, Stephen J., The Federal Tax Law of Conservation
Easements (4th ed. 1997), Appendix D
3. Uniform Conservation Easement Act (1981)
4. Uniform Conservation Easement Act (2007)
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
Drafted by the

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
and by it

APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT
IN ALL THE STATES
at its

ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS NINETIETH YEAR
IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
JULY 31 – AUGUST 7, 1981

WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS

Approved by the American Bar Association
Chicago, Illinois, January 26, 1982
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
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CHARLES M. HAAR, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
CHARLES G. KEPLER, P.O. Box 490, Cody, WY 82414
BROCKENBROUGH LAMB, JR., 1200 Mutual Building, Richmond, VA 23219
ANN REED, P.O. Box 629, Raleigh, NC 27602
ALLAN G. RODGERS, 2 Park Square, Boston, MA 02116
WILLIAM G. THOMAS, P.O. Box 820, Alexandria, VA 22313
ALLLAN D. VESTAL, University of Iowa, College of Law, Iowa City, IA 52242
RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, 101 Pearl Street, Hartford, CT 06103, Reporter
JOHN J. COSTONIS, New York University, School of Law, Room 307, Vanderbilt Hall,
40 Washington Square, South, New York, NY 10012, Reporter
JOHN C. DEACON, P.O. Box 1245, Jonesboro, AR 72401, President: 1979-81
(Member Ex Officio)
GEORGE C. KEELY, 1600 Colorado National Building, 950 Seventeenth Street,
Denver, CO 80202, President: 1977-79 (Member Ex Officio)
M. KING HILL, JR., Sixth Floor, 100 Light Street, Baltimore, MD 21202,
Chairman, Executive Committee (Member Ex Officio)
WILLIAM J. PIERCE, University of Michigan, School of Law, Ann Arbor, MI 48109,
Executive Director
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DON J. McCLENAHAN, 310 Simplot Building, Boise, ID 83702, Chairman
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Advisors to Special Committee on
Uniform Conservation Easement Act
JOHN M. FOWLER, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
JOHN R. LINTON, National Association of Realtors
NORMAN MARCUS, New York, NY
ROSS B. NETHERTON, American Bar Association, Section of Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law
ROBERT E. STIPE, Chapel Hill, NC
GLENN T. TIEDT, U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service
WALTER G. VAN DORN, American Bar Association, Section of Taxation
ALBERT B. WOLFF, American Bar Association

Copies of all Uniform and Model Acts and other printed matter issued by the Conference may be
obtained from:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
645 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 510
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214

Case: 19-11795

Date Filed: 12/20/2019

Page: 96 of 123

UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
Commissioners’ Prefatory Note
The Act enables durable restrictions and affirmative obligations to be
attached to real property to protect natural and historic resources. Under the
conditions spelled out in the Act, the restrictions and obligations are immune from
certain common law impediments which might otherwise be raised. The Act
maximizes the freedom of the creators of the transaction to impose restrictions on
the use of land and improvements in order to protect them, and it allows a similar
latitude to impose affirmative duties for the same purposes. In each instance, if the
requirements of the Act are satisfied, the restrictions or affirmative duties are
binding upon the successors and assigns of the original parties.
The Act thus makes it possible for Owner to transfer a restriction upon the
use of Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., which will be enforceable by Conservation
and its successors whether or not Conservation has an interest in land benefitted by
the restriction, which is assignable although unattached to any such interest in fact,
and which has not arisen under circumstances where the traditional conditions of
privity of estate and “touch and concern” applicable to covenants real are present.
So, also, the Act enables the Owner of Heritage Home to obligate himself and
future owners of Heritage to maintain certain aspects of the house and to have that
obligation enforceable by Preservation, Inc., even though Preservation has no
interest in property benefitted by the obligation. Further, Preservation may obligate
itself to take certain affirmative actions to preserve the property. In each case,
under the Act, the restrictions and obligations bind successors. The Act does not
itself impose restrictions or affirmative duties. It merely allows the parties to do so
within a consensual arrangement freed from common law impediments, if the
conditions of the Act are complied with.
These conditions are designed to assure that protected transactions serve
defined protective purposes (Section 1(1)) and that the protected interest is in a
“holder” which is either a governmental body or a charitable organization having an
interest in the subject matter (Section 1(2)). The interest may be created in the
same manner as other easements in land (Section 2(a)). The Act also enables the
parties to establish a right in a third party to enforce the terms of the transaction
(Section 3(a)(3)) if the possessor of that right is also a governmental unit or charity
(Section 1(3)).
The interested protected by the Act are termed “easements.” The
terminology reflects a rejection of two alternatives suggested in existing state acts
dealing with non-possessory conservation and preservation interests. The first
1
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removes the common law disabilities associated with covenants real and equitable
servitudes in addition to those associated with easements. As statutorily modified,
these three common law interests retain their separate existence as instruments
employable for conservation and preservation ends. The second approach seeks to
create a novel additional interest which, although unknown to the common law, is,
in some ill-defined sense, a statutorily modified amalgam of the three traditional
common law interests.
The easement alternative is favored in the Act for three reasons. First,
lawyers and courts are most comfortable with easements and easement doctrine,
less so with restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, and can be expected to
experience severe confusion if the Act opts for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the
easement is the basic less-than-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant
and the equitable servitude appeared only because of then-current, but now
outdated, limitations of easement doctrine. Finally, non-possessory interests
satisfying the requirements of covenant real or equitable servitude doctrine will
invariably meet the Act’s less demanding requirements as “easements.” Hence, the
Act’s easement orientation should not prove prejudicial to instruments drafted as
real covenants or equitable servitudes, although the converse would not be true.
In assimilating these easements to conventional easements, the Act allows
great latitude to the parties to the former to arrange their relationship as they see fit.
The Act differs in this respect from some existing statutes, such as that in effect in
Massachusetts, under which interests of this nature are subject to public planning
agency review.
There are both practical and philosophical reasons for not subjecting
conservation easements to a public ordering system. The Act has the relatively
narrow purpose of sweeping away certain common law impediments which might
otherwise undermine the easements’ validity, particularly those held in gross. If it
is the intention to facilitate private grants that serve the ends of land conservation
and historic preservation, moreover, the requirement of public agency approval
adds a layer of complexity which may discourage private actions. Organizations
and property owners may be reluctant to become involved in the bureaucratic, and
sometimes political, process which public agency participation entails. Placing
such a requirement in the Act may dissuade a state from enacting it for the reason
that the state does not wish to accept the administrative and fiscal responsibilities of
such a program.
In addition, controls in the Act and in other state and federal legislation
afford further assurance that the Act will serve the public interest. To begin with,
the very adoption of the Act by a state legislature facilitates the enforcement of
conservation easements serving the public interest. Other types of easements, real
2
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covenants and equitable servitudes are enforceable, even though their myriads of
purposes have seldom been expressly scrutinized by state legislative bodies.
Moreover, Section 1(2) of the Act restricts the entities that may hold conservation
and preservation easements to governmental agencies and charitable organization,
neither of which is likely to accept them on an indiscriminate basis. Governmental
programs that extend benefits to private donors of these easements provide
additional controls against potential abuses. Federal tax statutes and regulations,
for example, rigorously define the circumstances under which easement donations
qualify for favorable tax treatment. Controls relating to real estate assessment and
taxation of restricted properties have been, or can be, imposed by state legislatures
to prevent easement abuses or to limit potential loss of local property tax revenues
resulting from unduly favorable assessment and taxation of these properties.
Finally, the American legal system generally regards private ordering of property
relationships as sound public policy. Absent conflict with constitutional or
statutory requirements, conveyances of fee or non-possessory interests by and
among private entities is the norm, rather than the exception, in the United States.
By eliminating certain outmoded easement impediments which are largely
attributable to the absence of a land title recordation system in England centuries
earlier, the Act advances the values implicit in this norm.
The Act does not address a number of issues which, though of conceded
importance, are considered extraneous to its primary objective of enabling private
parties to enter into consensual arrangements with charitable organizations or
governmental bodies to protect land and buildings without the encumbrance of
certain potential common law impediments (Section 4). For example, with the
exception of the requirement of Section 2(b) that the acceptance of the holder be
recorded, the formalities and effects of recordation are left to the state’s registry
system; an adopting state may wish to establish special indices for these interests,
as has been done in Massachusetts.
Similarly unaddressed are the potential impacts of a state’s marketable title
laws upon the duration of conservation easements. The Act provides that
conservation easements have an unlimited duration unless the instruments creating
them provide otherwise (Section 2(c)). The relationship between this provision and
the marketable title act or other statutes addressing restrictions on real property of
unlimited duration should be considered by the adopting state.
The relationship between the Act and local real property assessment and
taxation practices is not dealt with; for example, the effect of an easement upon the
valuation of burdened real property presents issues which are left to the state and
local taxation system. The Act enables the structuring of transactions so as to
achieve tax benefits which may be available under the Internal Revenue Code, but
parties intending to attain them must be mindful of the specific provisions of the
3
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income, estate and gift tax laws which are applicable. Finally, the Act neither
limits nor enlarges the power of eminent domain; such matters as the scope of that
power and the entitlement of property owners to compensation upon its exercise are
determined not by this Act but by the adopting state’s eminent domain code and
related statutes.
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
1981 ACT

An Act to be known as the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, relating to
(here insert the subject matter requirements of the various states).
Section
1. Definitions.
2. Creation, Conveyance, Acceptance and Duration.
3. Judicial Actions.
4. Validity.
5. Applicability.
6. Uniformity of Application and Construction.

§ 1. [Definitions]. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Conservation easement” means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in
real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which
include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space
use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or
preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real
property.
(2) “Holder” means:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property
under the laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust,
the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic,
or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical,
architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
(3) “Third-party right of enforcement” means a right provided in a
conservation easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental body,
charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, which, although
eligible to be a holder, is not a holder.
5

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3511214

Case: 19-11795

Date Filed: 12/20/2019

Page: 101 of 123

Comment
Section 1 defines three central elements: What is meant by a conservation
easement; who can be a holder; and who can possess a “third-party right of
enforcement.” Only those interests held by a “holder,” as defined by the Act, fall
within the definitions of protected easements. Such easements are defined as
interests in real property. Even if so held, the easement must serve one or more of
the following purposes: Protection of natural or open-space resources; protection
of air or water quality; preservation of the historical aspects of property; or other
similar objectives spelled out in subsection (1).
A “holder” may be a governmental unit having specified powers (subsection
(2)(i)) or certain types of charitable corporations, associations, and trusts, provided
that the purposes of the holder include those same purposes for which the
conservation easement could have been created in the first place (subsection
(2)(ii)). The word “charitable”, in Section 1(2) and (3), describes organizations that
are charities according to the common law definition regardless of their status as
exempt organizations under any tax law.
Recognition of a “third-party right of enforcement” enables the parties to
structure into the transaction a party that is not an easement “holder,” but which,
nonetheless, has the right to enforce the terms of the easement (Sections 1(3),
3(a)(3)). But the possessor of the third-party enforcement right must be a
governmental body or a charitable corporation, association, or trust. Thus, if
Owner transfers a conservation easement on Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., he
could grant to Preservation, Inc., a charitable corporation, the right to enforce the
terms of the easement, even though Preservation was not the holder, and
Preservation would be free of the common law impediments eliminated by the Act
(Section 4). Under this Act, however, Owner could not grant a similar right to
Neighbor, a private person. But whether such a grant might be valid under other
applicable law of the adopting state is left to the law of that state. (Section 5(c).)

§ 2. [Creation, Conveyance, Acceptance and Duration].
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a conservation easement may
be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, terminated, or
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.
(b) No right or duty in favor of or against a holder and no right in favor of a
person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation
easement before its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.

6
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(c) Except as provided in Section 3(b), a conservation easement is unlimited
in duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.
(d) An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation
easement is created is not impaired by it unless the owner of the interest is a party
to the conservation easement or consents to it.
Comment
Section 2(a) provides that, except to the extent otherwise indicated in the
Act, conservation easements are indistinguishable from easements recognized
under the pre-Act law of the state in terms of their creation, conveyance,
recordation, assignment, release, modification, termination or alteration. In this
regard, subsection (a) reflects the Act’s overall philosophy of bringing less-than-fee
conservation interests under the formal easement rubric and of extending that rubric
to the extent necessary to effectuate the Act’s purposes given the adopting state’s
existing common law and statutory framework. For example, the state’s
requirements concerning release of conventional easements apply as well to
conservation easements because nothing in the Act provides otherwise. On the
other hand, if the state’s existing law does not permit easements in gross to be
assigned, it will not be applicable to conservation easements because Section 4(2)
effectively authorizes their assignment.
Conservation and preservation organizations using easement programs have
indicated a concern that instruments purporting to impose affirmative obligations
on the holder may be unilaterally executed by grantors and recorded without notice
to or acceptance by the holder ostensibly responsible for the performance of the
affirmative obligations. Subsection (b) makes clear that neither a holder nor a
person having a third-party enforcement right has any rights or duties under the
easement prior to the recordation of the holder’s acceptance of it.
The Act enables parties to create a conservation easement of unlimited
duration subject to the power of a court to modify or terminate it in states whose
case or statute law accords their courts that power in the case of easement. See
Section 3(b). The latitude given the parties is consistent with the philosophical
premise of the Act. However, there are additional safeguards; for example,
easements may be created only for certain purposes and may be held only by certain
“holders.” These limitations find their place comfortably within similar limitations
applicable to charitable trusts, whose duration may also have no limit. Allowing
the parties to create such easements also enables them to fit within federal tax law
requirements that the interest be “in perpetuity” if certain tax benefits are to be
derived.

7
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Obviously, an easement cannot impair prior rights of owners of interests in
the burdened property existing when the easement comes into being unless those
owners join in the easement or consent to it. The easement property thus would be
subject to existing liens, encumbrances and other property rights (such as
subsurface mineral rights) which pre-exist the easement, unless the owners of those
rights release them or subordinate them to the easement. (Section 2(d).)

§ 3. [Judicial Actions].
(a) An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought by:
(1) an owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the
easement;
(2) a holder of the easement;
(3) a person having a third-party right of enforcement; or
(4) a person authorized by other law.
(b) This Act does not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a
conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity.
Comment
Section 3 identifies four categories of persons who may bring actions to
enforce, modify or terminate conservation easements, quiet title to parcels burdened
by conservation easements, or otherwise affect conservation easements. Owners of
interests in real property burdened by easements might wish to sue in cases where
the easements also impose duties upon holders and these duties are breached by the
holders. Holders and persons having third-party rights of enforcement might
obviously wish to bring suit to enforce restrictions on the owners’ use of the
burdened properties. In addition to these three categories of persons who derive
their standing from the explicit terms of the easement itself, the Act also recognizes
that the state’s other applicable law may create standing in other persons. For
example, independently of the Act, the Attorney General could have standing in his
capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts, either by statute or at common law.
A restriction burdening real property in perpetuity or for long periods can
fail of its purposes because of changed conditions affecting the property or its
environs, because the holder of the conservation easement may cease to exist, or for
other reasons not anticipated at the time of its creation. A variety of doctrines,
8
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including the doctrines of changed conditions and cy pres, have been judicially
developed and, in many states, legislatively sanctioned as a basis for responding to
these vagaries. Under the changed conditions doctrine, privately created
restrictions on land use may be terminated or modified if they no longer
substantially achieve their purpose due to the changed conditions. Under the statute
or case law of some states, the court’s order limiting or terminating the restriction
may include such terms and conditions, including monetary adjustments, as it
deems necessary to protect the public interest and to assure an equitable resolution
of the problem. The doctrine is applicable to real covenants and equitable
servitudes in all states, but its application to easements is problematic in many
states.
Under the doctrine of cy pres, if the purposes of a charitable trust cannot
carried out because circumstances have changed after the trust came into being or,
for any other reason, the settlor’s charitable intentions cannot be effectuated, courts
under their equitable powers may prescribe terms and conditions that may best
enable the general charitable objective to be achieved while altering specific
provisions of the trust. So, also, in cases where a charitable trustee ceases to exist
or cannot carry out its responsibilities, the court will appoint a substitute trustee
upon proper application and will not allow the trust to fail.
The Act leaves intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states as
it relates to the modification and termination of easements and the enforcement of
charitable trusts.

§ 4. [Validity]. A conservation easement is valid even though:
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common
law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the
burdened property or upon the holder;
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
9
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Comment
One of the Act’s basic goals is to remove outmoded common law defenses
that could impede the use of easements for conservation or preservation ends.
Section 4 addresses this goal by comprehensively identifying these defenses and
negating their use in actions to enforce conservation or preservation easements.
Subsection (1) indicates that easements, the benefit of which is held in
gross, may be enforced against the grantor or his successors or assigns. By stating
that the easement need not be appurtenant to an interest in real property, it
eliminates the requirement in force in some states that the holder of the easement
must own an interest in real property (the “dominant estate”) benefitted by the
easement.
Subsection (2) also clarifies common law by providing that an easement
may be enforced by an assignee of the holder.
Subsection (3) addresses the problem posed by the common law’s
recognition of easements that served only a limited number of purposes and its
reluctance to approve so-called “novel incidents.” Easements serving the
conservation and preservation ends enumerated in Section 1(1) might fail of
enforcement under this restrictive view. Accordingly, subsection (3) establishes
that conservation or preservation easements are not unenforceable solely because
they do not serve purposes or fall within the categories of easements traditionally
recognized at common law.
Subsection (4) deals with a variant of the foregoing problem. The common
law recognized only a limited number of “negative easements” – those preventing
the owner of the burdened land from performing acts on his land that he would be
privileged to perform absent the easement. Because a far wider range of negative
burdens than those recognized at common law might be imposed by conservation or
preservation easements, subsection (4) modifies the common law by eliminating the
defense that a conservation or preservation easement imposes a “novel” negative
burden.
Subsection (5) addresses the opposite problem – the unenforceability at
common law of an easement that imposes affirmative obligations upon either the
owner of the burdened property or upon the holder. Neither of those interests was
viewed by the common law as true easements at all. The first, in fact, was labelled
a “spurious” easement because it obligated the owner of the burdened property to
perform affirmative acts. (The spurious easement was distinguished from an
affirmative easement, illustrated by a right of way, which empowered the

10
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easement’s holder to perform acts on the burdened property that the holder would
not have been privileged to perform absent the easement.)
Achievement of conservation or preservation goals may require that
affirmative obligations be incurred by the burdened property owner or by the
easement holder or both. For example, the donor of a facade easement, one type of
preservation easement, may agree to restore the facade to its original state;
conversely, the holder of a facade easement may agree to undertake restoration. In
either case, the preservation easement would impose affirmative obligations.
Subsection (5) treats both interests as easements and establishes that neither would
be unenforceable solely because it is affirmative in nature.
Subsections (6) and (7) preclude the touch and concern and privity of estate
or contract defenses, respectively. Strictly speaking, they do not belong in the Act
because they have traditionally been asserted as defenses against the enforcement
not of easements but of real covenants and of equitable servitudes. The case law
dealing with these three classes of interests, however, had become so confused and
arcane over the centuries that defenses appropriate to one of these classes may
incorrectly be deemed applicable to another. The inclusion of the touch and
concern and privity defenses in Section 4 is a cautionary measure, intended to
safeguard conservation and preservation easements from invalidation by courts that
might inadvertently confuse them with real covenants or equitable servitudes.

§ 5. [Applicability].
(a) This Act applies to any interest created after its effective date which
complies with this Act, whether designated as a conservation easement or as a
covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise.
(b) This Act applies to any interest created before its effective date if it
would have been enforceable had it been created after its effective date unless
retroactive application contravenes the constitution or laws of this State or the
United States.
(c) This Act does not invalidate any interest, whether designated as a
conservation or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude,
restriction, easement, or otherwise, that is enforceable under other law of this State.
Comment
There are four classes of interests to which the Act might be made
applicable: (1) those created after its passage which comply with it in form and
11
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purpose; (2) those created before the Act’s passage which comply with the Act and
which would not have been invalid under the pertinent pre-Act statutory or case law
either because the latter explicitly validated interests of the kind recognized by the
Act or, at least, was silent on the issue; (3) those created either before or after the
Act which do not comply with the Act but which are valid under the state’s statute
or case law; and (4) those created before the Act’s passage which comply with the
Act but which would have been invalid under the pertinent pre-Act statutory or case
law.
It is the purpose of Section 5 to establish or confirm the validity of the first
three classes of interests. Subsection (a) establishes the validity of the first class of
interests, whether or not they are designated as conservation or preservation
easements. Subsection (b) establishes the validity under the Act of the second
class. Subsection (c) confirms the validity of the third class independently of the
Act by disavowing the intent to invalidate any interest that does comply with other
applicable law.
Constitutional difficulties could arise, however, if the Act sought
retroactively to confer blanket validity upon the fourth class of interests. The owner
of the land ostensibly burdened by the formerly invalid interest might well succeed
in arguing that his property would be “taken” without just compensation were that
interest subsequently validated by the Act. Subsection (b) addresses this difficulty
by precluding retroactive application of the Act if such application “would
contravene the constitution or laws of (the) State or of the United States.” That
determination, of course, would have to be made by a court.

§ 6. [Uniformity of Application and Construction]. This Act shall be
applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws
with respect to the subject of the Act among states enacting it.

12
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
Prefatory Note
The Act enables durable restrictions and affirmative obligations to be attached to real
property to protect natural and historic resources. Under the conditions spelled out in the Act,
the restrictions and obligations are immune from certain common law impediments which might
otherwise be raised. The Act maximizes the freedom of the creators of the transaction to impose
restrictions on the use of land and improvements in order to protect them, and it allows a similar
latitude to impose affirmative duties for the same purposes. In each instance, if the requirements
of the Act are satisfied, the restrictions or affirmative duties are binding upon the successors and
assigns of the original parties.
The Act thus makes it possible for Owner to transfer a restriction upon the use of
Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., which will be enforceable by Conservation and its successors
whether or not Conservation has an interest in land benefitted by the restriction, which is
assignable although unattached to any such interest in fact, and which has not arisen under
circumstances where the traditional conditions of privity of estate and "touch and concern"
applicable to covenants real are present. So, also, the Act enables the Owner of Heritage Home
to obligate himself and future owners of Heritage to maintain certain aspects of the house and to
have that obligation enforceable by Preservation, Inc., even though Preservation has no interest
in property benefitted by the obligation. Further, Preservation may obligate itself to take certain
affirmative actions to preserve the property. In each case, under the Act, the restrictions and
obligations bind successors. The Act does not itself impose restrictions or affirmative duties. It
merely allows the parties to do so within a consensual arrangement freed from common law
impediments, if the conditions of the Act are complied with.
These conditions are designed to assure that protected transactions serve defined
protective purposes (Section 1(1)) and that the protected interest is in a "holder" which is either a
governmental body or a charitable organization having an interest in the subject matter (Section
1(2)). The interest may be created in the same manner as other easements in land (Section 2(a)).
The Act also enables the parties to establish a right in a third party to enforce the terms of the
transaction (Section 3(a)(3)) if the possessor of that right is also a governmental unit or charity
(Section 1(3)).
The interests protected by the Act are termed "easements." The terminology reflects a
rejection of two alternatives suggested in existing state acts dealing with non-possessory
conservation and preservation interests. The first removes the common law disabilities
associated with covenants real and equitable servitudes in addition to those associated with
easements. As statutorily modified, these three common law interests retain their separate
existence as instruments employable for conservation and preservation ends. The second
approach seeks to create a novel additional interest which, although unknown to the common
law, is, in some ill-defined sense, a statutorily modified amalgam of the three traditional
common law interests.
The easement alternative is favored in the Act for three reasons. First, lawyers and courts
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are most comfortable with easements and easement doctrine, less so with restrictive covenants
and equitable servitudes, and can be expected to experience severe confusion if the Act opts for a
hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic less-than-fee interest at common law;
the restrictive covenant and the equitable servitude appeared only because of then-current, but
now outdated, limitations of easement doctrine. Finally, non-possessory interests satisfying the
requirements of covenant real or equitable servitude doctrine will invariably meet the Act's less
demanding requirements as "easements." Hence, the Act's easement orientation should not prove
prejudicial to instruments drafted as real covenants or equitable servitudes, although the converse
would not be true.
In assimilating these easements to conventional easements, the Act allows great latitude
to the parties to the former to arrange their relationship as they see fit. The Act differs in this
respect from some existing statutes, such as that in effect in Massachusetts, under which interests
of this nature are subject to public planning agency review.
There are both practical and philosophical reasons for not subjecting conservation
easements to a public ordering system. The Act has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping
away certain common law impediments which might otherwise undermine the easements'
validity, particularly those held in gross. If it is the intention to facilitate private grants that serve
the ends of land conservation and historic preservation, moreover, the requirement of public
agency approval adds a layer of complexity which may discourage private actions.
Organizations and property owners may be reluctant to become involved in the bureaucratic, and
sometimes political, process which public agency participation entails. Placing such a
requirement in the Act may dissuade a state from enacting it for the reason that the state does not
wish to accept the administrative and fiscal responsibilities of such a program.
In addition, controls in the Act and in other state and federal legislation afford further
assurance that the Act will serve the public interest. To begin with, the very adoption of the Act
by a state legislature facilitates the enforcement of conservation easements serving the public
interest. Other types of easements, real covenants and equitable servitudes are enforceable, even
though their myriads of purposes have seldom been expressly scrutinized by state legislative
bodies. Moreover, Section 1(2) of the Act restricts the entities that may hold conservation and
preservation easements to governmental agencies and charitable organization, neither of which is
likely to accept them on an indiscriminate basis. Governmental programs that extend benefits to
private donors of these easements provide additional controls against potential abuses. Federal
tax statutes and regulations, for example, rigorously define the circumstances under which
easement donations qualify for favorable tax treatment. Controls relating to real estate
assessment and taxation of restricted properties have been, or can be, imposed by state
legislatures to prevent easement abuses or to limit potential loss of local property tax revenues
resulting from unduly favorable assessment and taxation of these properties. Finally, the
American legal system generally regards private ordering of property relationships as sound
public policy. Absent conflict with constitutional or statutory requirements, conveyances of fee
or non-possessory interests by and among private entities is the norm, rather than the exception,
in the United States. By eliminating certain outmoded easement impediments which are largely
attributable to the absence of a land title recordation system in England centuries earlier, the Act
advances the values implicit in this norm.
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The Act does not address a number of issues which, though of conceded importance, are
considered extraneous to its primary objective of enabling private parties to enter into consensual
arrangements with charitable organizations or governmental bodies to protect land and buildings
without the encumbrance of certain potential common law impediments (Section 4). For
example, with the exception of the requirement of Section 2(b) that the acceptance of the holder
be recorded, the formalities and effects of recordation are left to the state's registry system; an
adopting state may wish to establish special indices for these interests, as has been done in
Massachusetts.
Similarly unaddressed are the potential impacts of a state's marketable title laws upon the
duration of conservation easements. The Act provides that conservation easements have an
unlimited duration unless the instruments creating them provide otherwise (Section 2(c)). The
relationship between this provision and the marketable title act or other statutes addressing
restrictions on real property of unlimited duration should be considered by the adopting state.
The relationship between the Act and local real property assessment and taxation
practices is not dealt with; for example, the effect of an easement upon the valuation of burdened
real property presents issues which are left to the state and local taxation system. The Act
enables the structuring of transactions so as to achieve tax benefits which may be available under
the Internal Revenue Code, but parties intending to attain them must be mindful of the specific
provisions of the income, estate and gift tax laws which are applicable.
The Act neither limits nor enlarges the power of eminent domain; such matters as the
scope of that power and the entitlement of property owners to compensation upon its exercise are
determined not by this Act but by the adopting state's eminent domain code and related statutes.
For the reasons noted in the comment to Section 3, the Act does not directly address the
application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements. The Act leaves intact the
existing case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the enforcement of charitable
trusts. Such law may create standing to enforce a conservation easement in the Attorney General
or other person empowered to supervise charitable trusts (Section 3(4)).
Amendment to Prefatory Note approved by Executive Committee on February 3, 2007.
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
An Act to be known as the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, relating to (here insert
the subject matter requirements of the various states).
Section
1. Definitions.
2. Creation, Conveyance, Acceptance and Duration.
3. Judicial Actions.
4. Validity.
5. Applicability.
6. Uniformity of Application and Construction.
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(1) "Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real
property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining
or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.
(2) "Holder" means:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property
under the laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the
purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space
values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for agricultural, forest,
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or
water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real
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property.
(3) "Third-party right of enforcement" means a right provided in a conservation
easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental body, charitable corporation,
charitable association, or charitable trust, which, although eligible to be a holder, is not a holder.
Comment
Section 1 defines three central elements: What is meant by a conservation easement; who
can be a holder; and who can possess a "third-party right of enforcement." Only those interests
held by a "holder," as defined by the Act, fall within the definitions of protected easements.
Such easements are defined as interests in real property. Even if so held, the easement must
serve one or more of the following purposes: Protection of natural or open-space resources;
protection of air or water quality; preservation of the historical aspects of property; or other
similar objectives spelled out in subsection (1).
A "holder" may be a governmental unit having specified powers (subsection (2)(i) ) or
certain types of charitable corporations, associations, and trusts, provided that the purposes of the
holder include those same purposes for which the conservation easement could have been
created in the first place (subsection (2)(ii) ). The word "charitable", in Section 1(2) and (3),
describes organizations that are charities according to the common law definition regardless of
their status as exempt organizations under any tax law.
Recognition of a "third-party right of enforcement" enables the parties to structure into
the transaction a party that is not an easement "holder," but which, nonetheless, has the right to
enforce the terms of the easement (Sections 1(3), 3(a)(3) ). But the possessor of the third-party
enforcement right must be a governmental body or a charitable corporation, association, or trust.
Thus, if Owner transfers a conservation easement on Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., he could
grant to Preservation, Inc., a charitable corporation, the right to enforce the terms of the
easement, even though Preservation was not the holder, and Preservation would be free of the
common law impediments eliminated by the Act (Section 4). Under this Act, however, Owner
could not grant a similar right to Neighbor, a private person. But whether such a grant might be
valid under other applicable law of the adopting state is left to the law of that state. (Section
5(c).)
SECTION 2. CREATION, CONVEYANCE, ACCEPTANCE AND DURATION.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a conservation easement may be
created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or
affected in the same manner as other easements.
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(b) No right or duty in favor of or against a holder and no right in favor of a
person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation easement before its
acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.
(c) Except as provided in Section 3(b), a conservation easement is unlimited in
duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.
(d) An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation easement is
created is not impaired by it unless the owner of the interest is a party to the conservation
easement or consents to it.
Comment
Section 2(a) provides that, except to the extent otherwise indicated in the Act,
conservation easements are indistinguishable from easements recognized under the pre-Act law
of the state in terms of their creation, conveyance, recordation, assignment, release, modification,
termination or alteration. In this regard, subsection (a) reflects the Act's overall philosophy of
bringing less-than-fee conservation interests under the formal easement rubric and of extending
that rubric to the extent necessary to effectuate the Act's purposes given the adopting state's
existing common law and statutory framework. For example, the state's requirements
concerning release of conventional easements apply as well to conservation easements because
nothing in the Act provides otherwise. On the other hand, if the state's existing law does not
permit easements in gross to be assigned, it will not be applicable to conservation easements
because Section 4(2) effectively authorizes their assignment.
Conservation and preservation organizations using easement programs have indicated a
concern that instruments purporting to impose affirmative obligations on the holder may be
unilaterally executed by grantors and recorded without notice to or acceptance by the holder
ostensibly responsible for the performance of the affirmative obligations. Subsection (b) makes
clear that neither a holder nor a person having a third-party enforcement right has any rights or
duties under the easement prior to the recordation of the holder's acceptance of it.
The Act enables parties to create a conservation easement of unlimited duration subject to
the power of a court to modify or terminate the easement in accordance with the principles of
law and equity. See Section 3(b). The latitude given the parties is consistent with the
philosophical premise of the Act. However, there are additional safeguards; for example,
easements may be created only for certain purposes intended to serve the public interest and may
be held only by certain "holders." These limitations find their place comfortably within the
limitations applicable to charitable trusts, which may be created to last in perpetuity, subject to
the power of a court to modify or terminate the trust pursuant to the doctrine of cy pres. See
comment to Section 3. Allowing the parties to create such easements also enables them to fit
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within federal tax law requirements that the interest be "in perpetuity" if certain tax benefits are
to be derived.
Obviously, an easement cannot impair prior rights of owners of interests in the burdened
property existing when the easement comes into being unless those owners join in the easement
or consent to it. The easement property thus would be subject to existing liens, encumbrances
and other property rights (such as subsurface mineral rights) which pre-exist the easement, unless
the owners of those rights release them or subordinate them to the easement. (Section 2(d).)
Amendment to comment approved by Executive Committee on February 3, 2007
SECTION 3. JUDICIAL ACTIONS.
(a) An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought by:
(1) an owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement;
(2) a holder of the easement;
(3) a person having a third-party right of enforcement; or
(4) a person authorized by other law.
(b) This Act does not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a
conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity.
Comment
Section 3 identifies four categories of persons who may bring actions to enforce, modify
or terminate conservation easements, quiet title to parcels burdened by conservation easements,
or otherwise affect conservation easements. Owners of interests in real property burdened by
easements might wish to sue in cases where the easements also impose duties upon holders and
these duties are breached by the holders. Holders and persons having third-party rights of
enforcement might obviously wish to bring suit to enforce restrictions on the owners' use of the
burdened properties. In addition to these three categories of persons who derive their standing
from the explicit terms of the easement itself, the Act also recognizes that the state's other
applicable law may create standing in other persons. For example, independently of the Act, the
Attorney General could have standing in his capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts, either by
statute or at common law.
A restriction burdening real property in perpetuity or for long periods can fail of its
purposes because of changed conditions affecting the property or its environs, because the holder
of the conservation easement may cease to exist, or for other reasons not anticipated at the time
of its creation. A variety of doctrines, including the doctrines of changed conditions and cy pres,
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have been judicially developed and, in many states, legislatively sanctioned as a basis for
responding to these vagaries.
Under the changed conditions doctrine, privately created restrictions on land use may be
terminated or modified if they no longer substantially achieve their purpose due to the changed
conditions. Under the statute or case law of some states, the court's order limiting or terminating
the restriction may include such terms and conditions, including monetary adjustments, as it
deems necessary to protect the public interest and to assure an equitable resolution of the
problem. The doctrine is applicable to real covenants and equitable servitudes in all states, but
its application to easements is problematic in many states.
In 2000, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Third) Property:
Servitudes, which recommends that, in lieu of the traditional real property law doctrine of
changed conditions, the modification and termination of conservation easements held by
governmental bodies or charitable organizations be governed by a special set of rules modeled on
the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres. In their commentary, the drafters of the Restatement
explained that:
“[b]ecause of the public interests involved, these servitudes are afforded more stringent
protection than privately held conservation servitudes…”
The Act does not directly address the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements because: (i) the Act has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away
certain common law impediments that might otherwise undermine a conservation easement’s
validity, and researching the law relating to charitable trusts and how such law would apply to
conservation easements in each state was beyond the scope of the drafting committee’s charge,
and (ii) the Act is intended to be placed in the real property law of adopting states and states
generally would not permit charitable trust law to be addressed in the real property provisions of
their state codes. However, because conservation easements are conveyed to governmental
bodies and charitable organizations to be held and enforced for a specific public or charitable
purpose—i.e., the protection of the land encumbered by the easement for one or more
conservation or preservation purposes—the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it
relates to the enforcement of charitable trusts should apply to conservation easements. This was
recognized by the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code, approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2000, who explained in their comment to §414:
Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a trust, the creation and transfer
of an easement for conservation or preservation will frequently create a charitable trust.
The organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be deemed to be acting as
trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual or property arrangement.
Because of the fiduciary obligation imposed, the termination or substantial modification
of the easement by the “trustee” could constitute a breach of trust.
Under the doctrine of cy pres, if the purposes of a charitable trust cannot carried out
because circumstances have changed after the trust came into being or, for any other reason, the
settlor's charitable intentions cannot be effectuated, courts under their equitable powers may
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prescribe terms and conditions that may best enable the general charitable objective to be
achieved while altering specific provisions of the trust. So, also, in cases where a charitable
trustee ceases to exist or cannot carry out its responsibilities, the court will appoint a substitute
trustee upon proper application and will not allow the trust to fail.
The Act leaves intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to
the modification and termination of easements and the enforcement of charitable trusts. Thus,
while Section 2(a) provides that a conservation easement may be modified or terminated “in the
same manner as other easements,” the governmental body or charitable organization holding a
conservation easement, in its capacity as trustee, may be prohibited from agreeing to terminate
the easement (or modify it in contravention of its purpose) without first obtaining court approval
in a cy pres proceeding.
For a discussion of the application of charitable trust principles to conservation
easements, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements: A Case
Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U Rich. L. Rev. 1031 (2006); Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 421
(2005).
Amendment to comment approved by Executive Committee on February 3, 2007
SECTION 4. VALIDITY. A conservation easement is valid even though:
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the
burdened property or upon the holder;
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
Comment
One of the Act's basic goals is to remove outmoded common law defenses that could
impede the use of easements for conservation or preservation ends. Section 4 addresses this goal
by comprehensively identifying these defenses and negating their use in actions to enforce
conservation or preservation easements.
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Subsection (1) indicates that easements, the benefit of which is held in gross, may be
enforced against the grantor or his successors or assigns. By stating that the easement need not
be appurtenant to an interest in real property, it eliminates the requirement in force in some states
that the holder of the easement must own an interest in real property (the "dominant estate")
benefitted by the easement.
Subsection (2) also clarifies common law by providing that an easement may be enforced
by an assignee of the holder.
Subsection (3) addresses the problem posed by the common law's recognition of
easements that served only a limited number of purposes and its reluctance to approve so-called
"novel incidents." Easements serving the conservation and preservation ends enumerated in
Section 1(1) might fail of enforcement under this restrictive view. Accordingly, subsection (3)
establishes that conservation or preservation easements are not unenforceable solely because
they do not serve purposes or fall within the categories of easements traditionally recognized at
common law.
Subsection (4) deals with a variant of the foregoing problem. The common law
recognized only a limited number of "negative easements"-those preventing the owner of the
burdened land from performing acts on his land that he would be privileged to perform absent
the easement. Because a far wider range of negative burdens than those recognized at common
law might be imposed by conservation or preservation easements, subsection (4) modifies the
common law by eliminating the defense that a conservation or preservation easement imposes a
"novel" negative burden.
Subsection (5) addresses the opposite problem-the unenforceability at common law of an
easement that imposes affirmative obligations upon either the owner of the burdened property or
upon the holder. Neither of those interests was viewed by the common law as true easements at
all. The first, in fact, was labeled a "spurious" easement because it obligated the owner of the
burdened property to perform affirmative acts. (The spurious easement was distinguished from
an affirmative easement, illustrated by a right of way, which empowered the easement's holder to
perform acts on the burdened property that the holder would not have been privileged to perform
absent the easement.)
Achievement of conservation or preservation goals may require that affirmative
obligations be incurred by the burdened property owner or by the easement holder or both. For
example, the donor of a facade easement, one type of preservation easement, may agree to
restore the facade to its original state; conversely, the holder of a facade easement may agree to
undertake restoration. In either case, the preservation easement would impose affirmative
obligations. Subsection (5) treats both interests as easements and establishes that neither would
be unenforceable solely because it is affirmative in nature.
Subsections (6) and (7) preclude the touch and concern and privity of estate or contract
defenses, respectively. Strictly speaking, they do not belong in the Act because they have
traditionally been asserted as defenses against the enforcement not of easements but of real
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covenants and of equitable servitudes. The case law dealing with these three classes of interests,
however, had become so confused and arcane over the centuries that defenses appropriate to one
of these classes may incorrectly be deemed applicable to another. The inclusion of the touch and
concern and privity defenses in Section 4 is a cautionary measure, intended to safeguard
conservation and preservation easements from invalidation by courts that might inadvertently
confuse them with real covenants or equitable servitudes.
SECTION 5. APPLICABILITY.
(a) This Act applies to any interest created after its effective date which complies
with this Act, whether designated as a conservation easement or as a covenant, equitable
servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise.
(b) This Act applies to any interest created before its effective date if it would
have been enforceable had it been created after its effective date unless retroactive application
contravenes the constitution or laws of this State or the United States.
(c) This Act does not invalidate any interest, whether designated as a conservation
or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or
otherwise, that is enforceable under other law of this State.
Comment
There are four classes of interests to which the Act might be made applicable: (1) those
created after its passage which comply with it in form and purpose; (2) those created before the
Act's passage which comply with the Act and which would not have been invalid under the
pertinent pre-Act statutory or case law either because the latter explicitly validated interests of
the kind recognized by the Act or, at least, was silent on the issue; (3) those created either before
or after the Act which do not comply with the Act but which are valid under the state's statute or
case law; and (4) those created before the Act's passage which comply with the Act but which
would have been invalid under the pertinent pre-Act statutory or case law.
It is the purpose of Section 5 to establish or confirm the validity of the first three classes
of interests. Subsection (a) establishes the validity of the first class of interests, whether or not
they are designated as conservation or preservation easements. Subsection (b) establishes the
validity under the Act of the second class. Subsection (c) confirms the validity of the third class
independently of the Act by disavowing the intent to invalidate any interest that does comply
with other applicable law.
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Constitutional difficulties could arise, however, if the Act sought retroactively to confer
blanket validity upon the fourth class of interests. The owner of the land ostensibly burdened by
the formerly invalid interest might well succeed in arguing that his property would be "taken"
without just compensation were that interest subsequently validated by the Act. Subsection (b)
addresses this difficulty by precluding retroactive application of the Act if such application
"would contravene the constitution or laws of (the) State or of the United States." That
determination, of course, would have to be made by a court.
SECTION 6. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. This
Act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws
with respect to the subject of the Act among states enacting it.
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